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Introduction
A tariff reduction is one of the most important driving forces behind rapid growth of world trade. In an influential work, Baier and Bergstrand (2001, p. 22) report evidence suggesting that 'tariff reductions still explain almost three times as much trade growth as transport-cost declines.' As the traditional trade theory claims, growth of world trade is potentially gainful for not only an individual country but also the world. Nevertheless, a number of developing countries have a concern over trade liberalization for fear that it induces government revenue losses. In order to compensate for them, several countries have introduced another tax, e.g., a consumption tax or a value-added tax (VAT). 1 However, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010, p. 571) empirically find that 'for low income countries, implying no impact on the extent of revenue recovery.' Given these growing interests in the empirical literature, there is a theoretical literature that examines the effects of tariff-tax reforms. While this paper is along this line of research, we focus on one specific tariff-tax reform, which is increasingly recognized in the literature, in a context of imperfect competition. The policy reform we study consists of one unit of tariff reduction and the same unit of consumption tax increase. This policy reform, which is first addressed by Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) , is welfare-improving for a competitive small open economy. Keen and Ligthart (2002) generalize this result, but the same authors (Keen and Ligthart (2005) ) show that the same no longer survives imperfect competition. Concretely, assuming a duopoly served by a domestic and a foreign duopolists, and linear demand and marginal costs, Keen and Ligthart (2005) demonstrate that the pointby-point reform necessarily reduces welfare.
The finding of Keen and Ligthart (2005) is striking, but it deserves further investigations since it rests on many simplifying assumptions. Another purpose of this paper is to look at the effect of the tariff-tax reform on market access, which is defined by a value of import volumes at the world price. The reason for considering the market access effect is that market access issues have an increasing importance in the real world. The government levies a specific import tariff t ≥ 0 and a consumption tax τ ≥ 0.
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Given these assumptions, the profit of each firm is defined by
by noting that the world market price of the duopolized good is p − τ − t since p is the price at which the Home consumer purchases, i.e., it is the world price plus the consumption tax and tariff.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are determined by the system of the first-order conditions for profit maximization:
and the second-order conditions:
Totally differentiating (1) and (2), we have
from which the comparative static outcomes are
where ∆ is the determinant of the coefficient matrix:
which is assumed to be positive from the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 8 
Welfare Effects
Welfare of the Home country W consists of consumer surplus CS, the Home firm's profit π, consumption tax revenue, and tariff revenue:
where
consumption tax revenue = τ (x + y)
tariff revenue = ty,
and x and y are the function of τ and t from (1) and (2). Using (6)- (9) and differentiating (5) with respect to τ and t, we obtain
The policy reform suggested by Keen and Ligthart (2005) is defined by dτ = −dt > 0, namely one unit of tariff reduction is accompanied by one unit of consumption tax increase. Its welfare effect is calculated by subtracting (11) from (10):
Eq. (12) (τ, t) as follows. 
Effects on Government Revenue and Market Access
While the last section has focused on the welfare effect of the policy reform, this section turns to the other effects of it. Throughout this section, we exclusively focus on the linear demand case. The first is the effect on government revenue, and the second is the effect on market access.
Government Revenue Effect
The government revenue T is the sum of the consumption tax revenue and the tariff revenue, and given by
A change in the consumption tax and tariff is
Thus, the effect of one unit of tariff reduction accompanied by one unit consumption tax increase is
While the sign of (13) is generally ambiguous, Eq. (13) Proof. Straightforward from (13) . ||
The ambiguous result on the government revenue effect is parallel with the finding of Keen and Ligthart (2005) . However, what is worth noting is that the positive effect is more likely under decreasing marginal costs than constant marginal costs. This is because a large increase in the Foreign firm's output favorably affects both the consumption tax revenue and tariff revenue.
From the opposite reason, the government can lose from the reform under increasing marginal costs since the output expansion of the Foreign firm is mitigated as compared to the constant marginal costs case (see Figure 1 once again).
Market Access Effect
The last effect we are interested in is the market access effect. As is introduced in Introduction, this criterion of policy reform has an increasing importance, but it is not addressed in a context of imperfect competition.
This subsection fulfills this gap by using the present generalized model of Keen and Ligthart (2005) . Following Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008, p. 87), we define the market access M as 'the value of imports at the world market prices.'
Then, a change in τ and t affects M as follows.
Subtracting the latter from the former, and substituting (3) and (4) into the resulting expression, we have
which is definitely positive. Therefore, we have arrived at: One of the most important implications obtained in our analysis is that the point-by-point policy reform is not only easy to implement but also it can involve a win-win-win outcome, i.e., it can enhance all of welfare, government revenue, and market access particularly under decreasing marginal costs.
Concluding Remarks
Incorporating non-constant marginal costs into a model of Keen and Ligthart (2005) , we have examined the effect of a tariff cut combined with a consumption tax increase on welfare, government revenue, and market access. It is shown that all of these can improve as a result of the suggested policy reform under decreasing marginal costs.
Despite the above novelty, our analysis needs more elaboration. For instance, we have considered no inherent dynamic interaction between marginal costs and outputs by simply assuming decreasing marginal costs which are called static economies of scale. Alternatively, it is possible to build a dynamic game model of economies of scale as in Spence (1981) . It is our future research agenda to reconsider the robustness of our result in a richer setting.
c * (y) ≥ 0, and can be positive when the degree of c * (y) < 0 is sufficiently strong.
To prove statement (2), let us set c (x) = c * (y). Then, the numerator of (12) is rewritten as
where the second line eliminates τ and t from the two first-order conditions (1) and (2), and the third line uses c (x) = c * (y). Taking into account the second-order condition for the Foreign firm's profit maximization, and c * (y) ≥ 0, the above equation becomes negative, and hence we have arrived at statement (2).
Derivation of (13)
The effect of the reform on government revenue is
where the second equation uses (3) and (4), and the third equation follows from the assumption of linear demand.
Derivation of (14)
The effect of the reform on market access is
where Eq. (15) comes from linear demand, and Eq. (16) uses (2), i.e., τ + t = yp + p − c * (y). The positivity of (14) follows from the second-order condition for the Foreign firm's profit maximization, 2p − c * (y) < 0. strategic trade policies.
5. This paper assumes specific taxes because (i) we want to make the model as close to Keen and Ligthart's (2005) as possible, and (ii) ad valorem taxes make the analysis too complicated to obtain definite results.
6. In what follows, we employ simpler notations p and p to denote p (x + y) and p (x + y).
7. Throughout this paper, it is presupposed that both firms are active in equilibrium.
8. For the details of stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, see Zhang and Zhang (1998). 11. The derivation of (13) is left in Appendix.
12. The assumption that τ < t is empirically plausible and applicable to many countries, particularly developing countries. 
